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Abstract: We examine how the target country’s institutional image and home-host 
institutional and geographic distance influence the acquirer firms’ hiring financial 
advisors in cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) in the BRICS. Specifically, we scrutinize 
whether the acquirer hires financial advisor in the acquirer firm’s country, the target 
country or a global advisor. We argue that the acquirer is more likely to hire a financial 
advisor the poorer the institutional image of the target country and the greater the home-
host institutional and geographic distance. Using longitudinal data on 642 cross-border 
acquisitions during 2013-2017 in the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, China, India and South 
Africa, we empirically test the hypotheses. The findings have important implications for 
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scholars, policymakers and managers. Our results confirm that:  acquirer firms are more 
likely to hire a financial advisor in the acquirer’s country to advise a cross-border 
acquisition the greater the institutional distance between the countries. And, that 
acquirer firms are more likely to hire a global financial advisor to advise a cross-border 
acquisition the greater the geographic distance between the countries. 
Keywords – Mergers and acquisitions; Financial advisors; Institutional distance; 
Emerging-market multinational company; Institutional image. 
 
Resumo: Examinamos como a imagem institucional e as distâncias geográfica e 
institucional do país receptor influenciam as empresas adquirentes na contratação de 
assessores financeiros, em aquisições internacionais entre os países dos BRICS. 
Especificamente, examinamos se a adquirente contrata assessor financeiro no país de 
origem, no país de destino ou um assessor global. Argumentamos que é mais provável 
que o comprador contrate um assessor financeiro quanto pior for a imagem institucional 
do país de destino, maior forem as distâncias institucionais e geográficas entre os países. 
Usando dados longitudinais de 642 aquisições entre empresas dos BRICS - Brasil, 
Rússia, Índia, China, e África do Sul, entre 2013-2017, testamos empiricamente as 
hipóteses. As descobertas têm implicações importantes para acadêmicos, formuladores 
de políticas e gestores. Nossos resultados confirmam que: as empresas adquirentes têm 
maior probabilidade de contratar um assessor financeiro no país de origem quando a 
distância institucional for maior entre os países. Também é mais provável que as 
empresas adquirentes contratem um assessor financeiro global quando a distância 
geográfica entre os países é maior. 
Palavras-chave – Fusões e aquisições; Assessores financeiros; Distância institucional; 
Multinacional emergente; Imagem institucional. 
 
Introduction 
Despite the growing importance of acquisitions to firms’ growth, and the large increase in financial 
advisor services throughout the world, whether acquirer firms hire financial advisors and the what drives 
their choices of advisors is still unclear. Notwithstanding, extant research has already examined a few 
facets of firms’ choices regarding hiring advisors. For example, Rau (2000) found that acquirers advised 
by first-tier investment banks earn higher abnormal returns. Francis et al. (2014) documented that the 
advisors’ certification roles and experience in the target countries were valuable to acquirer firms. Ismail 
(2010) added that higher quality advisors, with superior expertise in the M&A market, have the ability to 
find better targets and create greater operational and financial synergies for shareholders. In contrast, other 
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scholars have failed to find a link between advisor quality (prestige or market share) and acquirer returns 
(Bowers & Miller, 1990; Michel, Shaked & Lee, 1991; Rau, 2000). Thus, albeit extant research has made 
substantial inroads into understanding the use of financial advisors by firms, it is unclear what types of 
advisors are hired and the conditions leading acquirers to hire advisors to provide support for the 
transactions. 
Financial advisors have been shown to play an important role in reducing information asymmetry 
and the transaction costs involved in an acquisition (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). That is important because 
of the information asymmetries in acquisitions that is likely to influence several aspects of the transaction 
such as the premium paid and cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date (Finnerty et 
al., 2012). Cross-border acquisitions are especially prone to raise additional challenges for the acquirers. 
These challenges include such aspects as the hazards of foreignness (Eden & Miller, 2004) and the 
institutional differences across home and target countries - including national culture, customer 
preferences and business practices -, and concerns regarding legitimacy in the target (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). In some instances, the acquirer’s lack of experience with CBAs or of operating in the target’s 
country may inhibit the confidence of stakeholders in the transaction. Other complications may include 
the misidentification of asset complementarities, assessment of the target value and market, among other 
potentially adverse conditions for the success of the transaction (Dikova et al., 2010). Investment banks, 
that are the most commonly contracted financial advisors, provide information regarding the several facets 
of the transaction (Allen et al., 2004). 
The challenges pertaining to institutional pressures and differences are likely to be greater in 
conducting CBAs into economies. That is because emerging economies tend to have poorer governance 
and systems of accountability (Luo & Tung, 2007) and the emerging economies firms (EEFs) to lack 
brand names and superior technology (He et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014). However, targeting EEFs may 
prove to be an opportunity for the acquirers’ growth strategy. Financial advisors can provide information 
about target firms, which includes, for example, growth opportunities, profit margins, customer and 
supplier relationships, contingent liabilities, labour relations, firms’ merger related experiences, existing 
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governance practices, and the willingness of target management to be acquired (Francis et al., 2014), but 
also on the country’s institutional profile. 
In this paper, we empirically evaluate how the institutional image of the target country, and the 
home-host distance influences the hiring of financial advisors. Our empirical context is the five main 
emerging economies – the BRICS. Our results confirm that:  acquirer firms are more likely to hire a 
financial advisor in the target’s country to advise a cross-border acquisition the poorer the institutional 
image of the target country. And, that acquirer firms are more likely to hire a global financial advisor to 
advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the geographic distance between the countries. 
Countries vary across a variety of structural features relevant to factors such as history, 
environment, climate, legal structures, political status, demography, etc. (Berry et al., 2010). From an 
institutional theory lens, one of the important issues which businesses need to address when making 
acquisitions abroad is the institutional gap between home and host countries or acquirers and target 
countries. Institutional gap is the degree to which the acquirer's institutional climate varies from that of 
the target countries (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Greater institutional distance is expected to raise the cost 
of doing business within the foreign nation as it is correlated with greater ambiguity and instability with 
the local environment (Zaheer, 1995). In addition to the institutional differences across countries, 
geographic distance has also been seen to have an impact on a number of international business aspects 
and decisions such as commerce, foreign investment and other forms of economic operation between 
nations (Anderson, 1979; Deadorff, 1998). Geographic distance increases transport and communication 
costs, and makes managing at a distance more hazardous (Hamilton & Winters, 1992; Fratianni & Oh, 
2009). 
We contribute to the literature in two main ways. First, we contribute to enrich the literature on the 
countries institutional image (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Moeller et al., 2013; Zaheer & Zaheer, 2005) by 
examining its effects on hiring financial advisor (Dikova et al., 2010). This is especially interesting in the 
context of emerging economies studies given the well-known institutional inefficiencies and hazards 
entailed in operating in these countries. A second contribution to the literature on cross-border 
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acquisitions.  Using CBAs as the context we address the hazards imposed from poor institutional image 
and distance between the home and target countries, and how firms respond to those hazards hiring 
financial advisors. Moreover, we add to the stream of research on acquisitions, which has been largely 
focused on post-acquisition outcomes (Dikova et al., 2010), by examining a decision in the pre-acquisition 
process. 
Literature Review 
Financial advisors in acquisitions 
The role of investment banks in the market of corporate transaction has received a fair amount of 
attention in the literature. Most notably, it's associated with the growing “investment banking” literature, 
that focuses on whether or not financial advisors will improve M&A deal performance, then highlights 
any reasons for potential gains (Bao & Edmans, 2011).Top-level financial advisors can distinguish deals 
with higher total synergies. However, they are not ready to provide a bargaining advantage to capture a 
larger share of these synergies (Bowers & Miller, 1990). A study found that deals advised by a moderately 
less renowned advisor outperformed deals advised by bulge bracket investment banks in terms of bidder 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) (Michel, Shaked, and Lee, 1991). 
Some studies evaluate the choice of M&As advisors showing that prior relationships with the bank, 
the advisor’s industry expertise, and a relationship with the merging partner have a positive impact on the 
advisor’s choice for a particular transaction (Chang et al., 2010).  The performance persistence of M&A 
advisors were studied by Bao and Edmans (2011),  identifying significant fixed effects at the bank level 
and further demonstrate that for the next several years, advisors in the top quintile of acquirer performance 
continue to provide better advice than those in the bottom quintile of acquirer performance.   
For example, exploitation information from 15,344 deals created between 1998 and 2007, Bao and 
Edmans (2011) show that there's a big investment bank fastened impact in M&A announcement returns, 
and their empirical study suggests that investment banks do so create a distinction to M&A outcomes, 
particularly once handled by top tier advisors. Other studies made a comparison of the value created by 
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top financial advisors in M&A deals with non - top advisors. Their empirical evidence suggests that the 
advisor creates more value for the acquisition of the corporate shareholders indeed (Golubov, Petmezas 
& Travlos, 2012). This value creation stems from their ability to identify synergistic combinations for 
bidders (Golubov, Petmezas & Travlos, 2012). 
A research examines 6,379 American M&A deals and finds that tier-two advisors produce 
additional price than tier-one advisors, a result driven chiefly by massive loss deals by tier-one advisors 
(Ismail, 2010). The author suggests that investment bankers have completely different incentives after 
they advise on massive vs. tiny deals. In distinction, exploitation 2016 transactions from 1995 to 2006, 
Song, Wei, and Zhou dynasty (2013) realize that “boutique” advisors can do additional favourable deal 
outcomes compared with “full-service” investment bankers, as a result of dress shop advisors have 
additional expertise and skills in advanced deals in their chosen business.  
Another strand of literature examines what parts confirm the chance that a financial advisor are 
chosen by acquirers/ targets. It was noted   that previous acquirer performance is a crucial determinant, 
and economic process can align advisors' and clients' interest within the deal by Sibilkov and McConnell 
(2014). A study examine 473 american´s M&A deals and notice that previous acquirers relationships, the 
name of the adviser, and deal quality are the most factors, with their results indicating the “certification 
role” of monetary advisors (Forte et al.,2010).  Another study uses 1,792 America deals, from 1990 to 
2003, to gauge whether or not and how relationships influence a bidder's alternative of financial adviser, 
and their proof suggests that bidders' M&A expertise and strategies of payment are vital factors to be 
thought-about (Francis et al., 2014). 
Finally, empirical studies additionally extend the “certification role” of advisors into the initial 
public offering and bond-issuing markets. for instance, Fang (2005) uses quite 3000 bond problems within 
the US market and finds that advisors' reputation relates considerably to bond-issuing quality. In the IPO 
market, (Beatty & Welch, 1996; Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998) realize that advisors' name is connected 
considerably to initial public offering firms' first-day returns. 
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The existing empirical literature is inconclusive regarding the hiring the financial advisor; 
however, these studies do not explore the impact of choosing financial advisor when buying a target at a 
BRICS country. The present paper links hiring financial advisor with the geographic and institutional 
distance between the counterparts.   
Countries institutional images and cross-country differences 
The institutional image is a part of the country image, the country which a consumer associates 
with a certain product or brand as being its source, regardless of where the product is produced 
(Diamantopoulos et al., 2017). Its effect, in the form of country of origin (COO) effect, has been discussed 
in marketing (Balabanis & Diamantopoulos, 2004; Diamantopoulos et al., 2017; Herz & Diamantopoulos, 
2013) to, for instance, refer to the picture, reputation and stereotype that consumers link to the products 
of a specific country under the influence of representative products, national characteristics, political and 
economic background, history and traditions (Diamantopoulos et al., 2017). The concern of the COO 
effect is whether the foreignness of products, brands are less chosen by customers in different countries 
due to ethnocentrism (Balabanis & Diamantopoulos, 2004; Herz & Diamantopoulos, 2013). 
The COO concept began to be used on the international context. Organizations can be pointed from 
its legitimacy from their COO, in other words from perceptions of the legitimacy of the institutional 
context in which they are inserted and of other organizations to which they are seen to be related or 
connected. The application of COO has been extended from products to people and organizations in 
international contexts. In the context of CBAs, this relationship can reveal that buyers from certain 
countries might be perceived legitimate in a specific country, depending on the overall legitimacy of the 
COO of the CBA’s acquirer in the target country (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2005; He & Zhang, 2018).  
To explain the influence of home country on global strategy, the authors examine the resource-
based view and its application to international business (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; He & Zhang, 2018). The 
authors also analyse the advantages and disadvantages of developing-country multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in comparison with developed-country MNEs. Developing-country MNEs tend to be less 
competitive than their developed-country counterparts, partly because they suffer the disadvantage of 
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operating in home countries with underdeveloped institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). The study 
was extended analysing how a firm's country of origin affects its investments abroad. Integrating the 
resource-based view and the country-of-origin literature to view the country of origin as a resource, 
explaining the advantage (disadvantage) of foreignness, the relative benefit (liability) a subsidiary of a 
foreign firm enjoys over domestic firms when its country of origin is liked (disliked) by individuals in the 
host country (Cuervo-Cazurra & Un, 2015; He & Zhang, 2018). Finally a study was made to complete the 
analysis how emerging market firms upgrade their capabilities by focusing on “uncommoditizing 
strategies” that enable them to achieve levels of international competitiveness beyond the comparative 
advantages of their home countries and serve markets with premium pricing, quality and reputation of 
products (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019). 
The impact of institutional image is the photography, reputation and stereotype that stakeholders 
link to companies of a specific country that carry domestic heritage by the influence of national 
background, mainly institutional characteristics (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Institutional frameworks are 
the main forces which impact firms´s outcomes and believes at international business and context (Peng 
et al., 2008). Institutional image occurs through associations as for example a positive evaluation of 
organizations from a certain country might be perceived as endorsement of its policies, practices, and 
actions. The institutional image perceptions of local entities, such as regulators, consumers, investors, and 
other stakeholders, form a part of the host country’s institutional environment that foreign firms confront 
(Chattalas et al., 2008; Sharma, 2011; He & Zhang, 2018).  
Countries differ in an array of institutional characteristics concerning such aspects as culture, 
geography, economy, legal systems, political profile, demography, and so forth (Berry et al., 2010).  From 
an institutional theory lens, one necessary issue that firms must think about once creating acquisitions 
abroad is that the institutional distance between home and host countries or acquirer and target countries. 
Institutional distance is that the extent of the distinction between the institutional environments of the 
acquirer and target countries (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Greater institutional distance will probably 
increase the costs of doing business within the foreign country, as it is associated with bigger uncertainty 
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and strangeness with the local surroundings (Zaheer, 1995). As a result, it is troublesome for firms to 
transfer strategic routines and practices between affiliates and to achieve legitimacy within the foreign 
market (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Researchers have prompt and empirical proof has confirmed that 
company’s investment in countries characterised by higher political and economic risk are additional 
doubtless to like lower equity possession modes in an attempt to scale back their exposure to uncertainty 
and preserve their flexibility (Anderson, 1979; Deadorff, 1998). 
Differences between the institutional distance are shown to decrease the power of CBAs to with 
success complete acquisitions and will increase the time it takes to complete proclaimed deals (Dikova et 
al, 2010). Institutional distance has also been shown to decrease the aggressiveness and equity level taken 
throughout cross-border acquisitions by a lot of ancient CBAs although this might not hold true for 
emerging markets (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). CBAs at emerging markets suggest that the results of 
institutional distance could also be less negative, and in some cases positive in impact, than what's found 
in developed world CBAs (Luo & Tung, 2007). Specifically, bound dimensions of distance, specifically 
people who would facilitate complete the institutional voids same to be present in rising markets (Khanna 
& Palepu, 2006), such as knowledge quality protection and economic stability, could increase acquisition 
aggressiveness. what is more, as EMNEs look to amass strategic assets abroad, they will be at risk of 
additional aggressive acquisitions in institutionally distant locations (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). 
As international enterprises internationalize, they encounter a host of country level variations that 
contribute to specific types of distance, like cultural, body and economic distance (Ghemawat, 2001). One 
amongst the foremost common proxies of institutional distance is additional accurately represented as 
cultural distance. The results of studies examining the results of cultural differences, points to the larger 
proposition behind institutional distance, that distance has negative effects on CBA behavior and outcomes 
(Barkema et al., 1996). Cultural distance has been shown to encourage entry through whole owned 
subsidiaries instead of acquisitions (Harzing, 2002). Some authors found that companies from countries 
with comparatively higher quality establishments were more probably to take a position in whole owned 
subsidiaries, whereas those from comparatively lower quality establishments tend to take a position 
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through acquisitions, suggesting cross-border acquisitions are going to be a primary vehicle of 
internationalisation for emerging markets CBAs, which were supported by  Francis et al. (2014).  
Recent review of the idea of institutional distance suggests that there's a desire to arrange the 
research stream (Berry et al., 2010), since authors typically use disparate proxies of the institutional 
distance notion, most frequently within the variety of some variation of cultural distance (Xu & Shenkar, 
2002). As such, a study supplys 9 sub-dimensions of institutional distance that are on paper separate and 
provides an additional nuance understanding of the idea, that once utilized by researchers can additional 
accurately differentiate and depict once, how, and why completely different components of institutional 
distance matters. These nine sub-dimensions are economic, financial, political, body, cultural, 
demographic, knowledge, world connectedness, and geographic (Berry et al., 2010). 
Hypotheses  
Generally, CBAs are risky because of target management resistance (Holl & Kyriazis, 1996), 
managerial ownership (O’Sullivan & Wong, 1998), deal structure (Sun et al., 2012), termination fees 
(Calcagno & Falconieri, 2014), and information asymmetry between acquirers and targets (Dikova et al., 
2010; Muehlfeld et al., 2012). CBAs have been particularly associated with challenges due to the liability 
of foreignness (Eden & Miller, 2004). This challenge refers to differences in institutional forces, including 
national culture, customer preferences, and business practices; they are exacerbated impediments to MNC 
legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and to successful acquisition and realization of strategic objectives 
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009; He & Zhang, 2018).  
The acquirer’s lack of experience with implementing acquisitions, organizational inertia in 
absorbing the target, and prior absence in the target country may inhibit the benefits of acquisition and the 
confidence of stakeholders in the target country. Additionally, misidentification of asset 
complementarities, complications in target assessment, and informational asymmetries may also have 
adverse effects on purchase success (Dikova et al., 2010). There are reasons that are specific to EEFs. 
From an internal perspective, EEFs are known to have poor governance and accountability (Luo & Tung, 
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2007), and they lack famous brand names and superior technology (He et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014). 
Their disadvantages partly originate from EEFs and their home countries’ late entry into international 
competition (Wang et al., 2012; He & Zhang, 2018). EEFs lack the critical international experience and 
managerial competence needed to organize global activities as well as professional expertise in functional 
areas, such as international accounting, finance, marketing, and law.  
A target country’s underdeveloped strategic factor markets also constrain both an EM firm’s access 
to managerial expertise and its ability to develop sophisticated technologies, build global brands, and 
organize complex manufacturing operations (Tolentino, 2010; Wang et al., 2012). As a result, EEFs may 
find that CBAs does not readily translate into value (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). These challenges can lead 
acquirer firms to hire financial advisors. In the following sections we develop the hypotheses. 
 
Institutional image of the target country and the choice of a financial advisor 
Institutional frameworks are the main forces which impact firms´s outcomes and believes at 
international business and context (Peng et al., 2008). Because of that we focus on the impact of 
institutional image, which is defined as the reputation, the picture and stereotype which stakeholders 
connect to companies of a certain country. The countries which originates the companies carries domestic 
heritage, under the influence of national background, especially institutional characteristics (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). Institutional image has standardizing affiliations with the end goal that a positive 
assessment of associations from a specific nation may be underwriting of its strategies, practices, and 
activities (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2005; He & Zhang, 2018). 
The institutional image is a part of the country image, the country which a consumer associates 
with a certain product or brand as being its source, regardless of where the product is produced 
(Diamantopoulos et al., 2017). The concern of the relevant distance is due to the target mix of products, 
brands are less chosen by customers in different countries due to ethnocentrism (Balabanis & 
Diamantopoulos, 2004; Herz & Diamantopoulos, 2013). 
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The institutional image perceptions of local companies, for example, financial specialists, 
controllers, buyers and different partners, structure a piece of the host nation’s institutional condition that 
foreign firms must deal with (Scott, 1995; Chattalas et al., 2008; Sharma, 2011). For firms from EMs that 
venture into worldwide markets, one type of the risk of strangeness is the nearby stereotyped impression 
of their attributes as an institutional picture impact. Firm notoriety is one of the casual institutional 
imperatives on MNCs (Dikova et al., 2010). The institutional image is a cognitive and normative process 
(Scott, 1995; Chattalas et al., 2008; Sharma, 2011). 
From an institutional reasoning, an institutional image impact can be because of the stereotyping 
of the host nation as a rearranged method in intellectual research of tending to an absence of data about 
the outside element by arranging dependent on psychological structures, for example, compositions and 
generalizations (Diamantopoulos et al., 2017). The host nation’s legitimating condition frequently has less 
data to evaluate an outside element, bringing about doubt and examination of the last mentioned, 
additionally prompting the utilization of cliché appraisals that can emerge from long established, 
underestimated suspicions in the host condition in regard to this substance from a specific home nation 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
With the venture into abroad markets, the institutional image of a company’s nation of origin can 
impact its acknowledgment by host nation partners, that is, shareholders in general, rivalry, clients, 
partners, (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2005). Institutional image is an identification to the contributing company’s 
experience and history when looking for partners. This effect will influence their pre-acquisition processes 
also. The predisposition of a target country’s constituents toward acquisitions by foreign acquirer due to 
their institutional images can exert bad or good effects on takeover success (Moeller et al., 2013). 
Institutional image of EEFs is often negative because of domestic institutional constraints. EEFs’ 
corporate governance is considered for outsiders, weak because these countries generally do not have 
developed stock markets and they are frequent suffer from government intervention (Zhang & Ebbers, 
2011). And, the EEFs have a weak brand association and poor country image. Therefore, they also suffer 
from suspicious accountability and transparency which can make the investors reluctant to invest in 
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emerging market countries (Wang et al., 2014). As a result, to have a positive institutional image 
perception can be the key for acceptance in host countries and for CBAs. 
Based on the presented arguments, we contend that a foreign acquirer prefers to hire a financial 
advisor in the acquirer’s country due to the uncertainty and risk associated with the poor institutional 
image of the target´s country at the BRICs. Hiring a financial advisor in the acquirer’s country will allow 
the acquirer to alleviate some of these negative effects by reducing the information asymmetry and costs 
caused by the institutional differences. Hence, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 1a. Acquirer firms are 
more likely to hire a financial advisor in the acquirer’s country to advise a cross-border acquisition the 
poorer the institutional image of the target country. 
We also contend that a foreign acquirer prefers to hire a financial advisor in the target’s country 
due to the uncertainty and risk associated with the poor institutional image of the target´s country at the 
BRICs. Hiring a financial advisor in the target’s country will allow the acquirer to alleviate some of these 
negative effects by reducing the information asymmetry and costs caused by the institutional differences. 
Hence, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 1b. Acquirer firms are more likely to hire a financial advisor in 
the target’s country to advise a cross-border acquisition the poorer the institutional image of the target 
country. 
Finally, we contend that a foreign acquirer prefers to hire a global financial advisor due to the 
uncertainty and risk associated with the poor institutional image of the target´s country at the BRICs. 
Hiring a global financial advisor will allow the acquirer to alleviate some of these negative effects by 
reducing the information asymmetry and costs caused by the institutional differences. Hence, we 
hypothesize that: Hypothesis 1c. Acquirer firms are more likely to hire a global financial advisor to advise 
a cross-border acquisition the poorer the institutional image of the target country. 
 
Institutional distance between the acquirer and target country and the choice of a financial advisor 
Institutional distance is that the extent of the distinction between the institutional environments of 
the acquirer and target countries (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Greater institutional distance will probably 
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increase the costs of doing business within the foreign country, as it is associated with bigger uncertainty 
and strangeness with the local surroundings (Zaheer, 1995). Considering a CBA transaction in the 
emerging market, this can enhance de institutional distance between the acquirer country and the target 
country.  
CBA’s acquirers are concerned with institutional distance because the emphasis on flows of 
information between the acquirer and target countries lends itself to a conceptualization based on cultural 
and psychic differences, which raise the uncertainty and hence the information asymmetry between 
acquirers and targets (Dikova et al., 2010; Muehlfeld et al., 2012). CBAs have been particularly associated 
with challenges due to the liability of foreignness (Eden & Miller, 2004). This challenge refers to 
differences in institutional forces, including national culture, customer preferences, and business practices; 
they are exacerbated impediments to MNC legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and to successful 
acquisition and realization of strategic objectives (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). 
Based on the presented arguments, we contend that a foreign acquirer prefers to hire financial 
advisor in the acquirer’s country due to the uncertainty and risk associated with greater differences in 
terms of institutional distance between the acquirer and the target countries. Hiring a financial advisor in 
the acquirer’s country will allow the acquirer to alleviate some of these negative effects by reducing the 
information asymmetry and costs caused by the institutional distance. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2a. Acquirer firms are more likely to hire a financial advisor in the acquirer’s country to 
advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the institutional distance between the countries. 
We also contend that a foreign acquirer prefers to hire financial advisor in the target’s country due 
to the uncertainty and risk associated with greater differences in terms of institutional distance between 
the acquirer and the target countries. Hiring a financial advisor in the target’s country will allow the 
acquirer to alleviate some of these negative effects by reducing the information asymmetry and costs 
caused by the institutional distance. Hence, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 2b. Acquirer firms are more 
likely to hire a financial advisor in the target’s country to advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the 
institutional distance between the countries. 
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Finally, we contend that a foreign acquirer prefers to hire global financial advisor due to the 
uncertainty and risk associated with greater differences in terms of institutional distance between the 
acquirer and the target countries. Hiring a global financial advisor will allow the acquirer to alleviate some 
of these negative effects by reducing the information asymmetry and costs caused by the institutional 
distance. Hence, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 2c. Acquirer firms are more likely to hire a global 
financial advisor to advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the institutional distance between the 
countries. 
 
Geographic distance between the acquirer and target country and the choice of a financial advisor 
In addition to the institutional differences across countries, geographic distance has also been 
shown to bear an effect on a variety of international business facets and decisions such as trade, foreign 
investment, and other types of economic activity taking place between countries (Anderson, 1979; 
Deadorff, 1998). Geographic distance increases transport and communication costs, and makes managing 
at a distance more hazardous (Hamilton & Winters, 1992; Fratianni & Oh, 2009).  
Different methods have been used to examine geographic distance between pairs of countries. For 
example, Chen (2004) calculated geographic distance according to the latitude and longitude of the main 
city in each region or country and found that geographic distance decreased international trade between 
pairs of countries. In order to measure geographical distance, Krishna (2003) used direct line distance. 
 Based on the presented arguments, we contend that a foreign acquirer prefers to hire a financial 
advisor in the acquirer’s country due to the uncertainty and risk associated with greater differences in 
terms of geographic distance between the acquirer and the target countries. Hiring a financial advisor in 
the acquirer’s country will allow the acquirer to alleviate some of these negative effects by reducing the 
information asymmetry and costs caused by the geographic distances. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3a. Acquirer firms are more likely to hire a financial advisor in the acquirer’s country to 
advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the geographic distance between the countries. 
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We also contend that a foreign acquirer prefers to hire a financial advisor in the target’s country 
due to the uncertainty and risk associated with greater differences in terms of geographic distance between 
the acquirer and the target countries. Hiring a financial advisor in the target’s country will allow the 
acquirer to alleviate some of these negative effects by reducing the information asymmetry and costs 
caused by the geographic distances. Hence, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 3b. Acquirer firms are more 
likely to hire a financial advisor in the target’s country to advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the 
geographic distance between the countries. 
Finally, we contend that a foreign acquirer prefers to hire a global financial advisor due to the 
uncertainty and risk associated with greater differences in terms of geographic distance between the 
acquirer and the target countries. Hiring a global financial advisor will allow the acquirer to alleviate some 
of these negative effects by reducing the information asymmetry and costs caused by the geographic 
distances. Hence, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 3c. Acquirer firms are more likely to hire a global 
financial advisor to advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the geographic distance between the 
countries. 
Method 
Data and sample 
Data for this study was collected from multiple secondary sources. Data on the cross-border 
acquisitions was extracted from the Thomson Financial Merger & Acquisition database (SDC). This 
database is the most frequently used (e.g., Capron & Guillén, 2009; Capron & Shen, 2007). and offers 
information about deal status, date of announcement, completion or abandonment, some characteristics 
on the ownership stake, industries of both firms, location, and the financial advisors employed, among 
others.  
Data collection followed some procedures to select and delimit the sample. First, we only included 
CBAs in which the target firm was in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the 
acquiring firm was foreign to any of these countries. Second, we excluded all deals in which the current 
status was not completed. Third we delimited the period to the acquisitions completed between 2013 and 
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2017. For deals prior to 2013, information about financial advisors is much scarcer, and we would like to 
study recent transactions. Therefore, we start the sample period in 2013. Finally, we selected only deals 
which the acquirer hired a financial advisor. With these procedures, we obtained a final sample of 642 
CBAs. 
The details of the sample are as follows. Brazil was the target country in 115 CBAs, Russia in 40, 
India in 146, China 301 and South Africa in 40. The deal size was higher than US$ 100 million in 213 
CBAs; with the largest transaction being a CBA by a firm in Hong Kong acquiring a Chinese target. The 
year distribution reveals 156 CBAs in 2013, 142 in 2014, 146 in 2015, 89 in 2016 and 109 in 2017. 
Acquirers had previous CBA experience in 102 cases. And regarding ownership, 413 CBAs involved 
acquiring ownership in excess of 50% of the target equity. The target hired a financial advisor in only 229 
cases. Finally, in most cases the industry of the acquirer was not the same of the target, which means 





 We have three dependent variables to ascertain is the decision of hiring a financial advisor to 
provide support for the CBA transaction. All data regarding the location or type of financial advisor was 
collected from SDC Thomson Financial Merger & Acquisition database. We classified all the advisors of 
the CBAs collected, of the acquirer´s, in three main categories: acquirer country, target country and global 
advisor. This was made for each case depending of the headquarter location of each financial advisor. 
Hiring a financial advisor in the acquirer’s country and it was coded in a dichotomous variable, 
for hypotheses 1 were classified if the financial advisor was from the acquirer´s country (1), or if not (0).  
The second dependent variable assessed hiring a financial advisor in the target country. This 
variable was assessed dichotomously with 1 - hire– an advisor, and 0 – did not hire financial advisor in 
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the target country. Data was extracted from Thomson Financial Merger & Acquisition database. And for 
the last set of hypotheses we classified if the financial advisor was global advisor (1), or if not (0).  
 
Independent variables 
We have three independent variables in this study. We use the perceived institutional quality to 
capture the Institutional image of the target, derived from the WGI. Institutional image stereotyping is a 
cognitive and normative process as a part of institutional environments (Chattalas et al., 2008; Scott, 
1995). EMNCs generally carry their domestic institutional heritage into host countries (Wang et al., 2014). 
Thus, the institutional quality of the investing nations forms an important basis for stakeholders' 
perceptions and labeling of foreign firms (Luo & Tung, 2007).  
The target country’s institutional image refers to the perceived institutional quality of the target 
country. Data for this variable was collected from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) Index (data 
available in www.govindicators.org). The WGI reports aggregate and individual governance indicators 
for over 200 countries, in six dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. These six 
indicators are based on over 30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of a large 
number of survey respondents and expert assessments. Data were collected from several survey institutes, 
think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. We 
used the average of the six indicators, transforming in a unique index. Since the deals we investigated took 
place between 2013 and 2017, institutional image is a time varied variable for each target (Kaufmann 
et.al., 2010). 
We measured institutional distance between the acquirer and the target firms’ countries as the 
difference in institutional quality between the two countries. Institutional quality was measured using the 
mean of the six WGI indicators. The absolute difference in the countries institutional quality was used to 
measure distance in this study. 
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Geographic distance between the acquirer and the target firms’ countries was measured as the 
great circle distance between the acquirer firm’s country and the target country according to the 
coordinates of the geographic centre of the countries (cfr. Berry et al., 2010) The data on geographic 
distance is publicly available at http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/ciber/faculty_research.asp. We use the 
log value of the distance in kilometres. 
 
Control variables 
We have further included several control variables at the acquirer and target firms, transaction, 
industry, year and country. At the firm’s level we controlled for the acquirer experience to account for the 
effect of learning experience. We operationalized as a dummy variable with a value of 1 if an acquirer had 
prior CBA experience, and 0 otherwise. Data was collected from SDC of Thomson. Control acquisition 
was used to control for the effect of acquiring control of the target. It is operationalized as a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if an acquirer bought more than 50% of the target, and a value of 0 it was less 
than 50%. Data collected from SDC of Thomson. Target public indicates whether the target firm is a 
public company and was used to control for the effect of governance. It was operationalized as a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 for target firms that are public, and 0 otherwise. Data was collected from 
SDC of Thomson. Acquirer public indicates whether the acquirer is a public company and was used to 
control for the effect of governance. It was operationalized as a dummy variable with a value of 1 if an 
acquirer is a publicly traded firm and a value of 0 otherwise. Data collected from SDC of Thomson. Target 
hired financial indicates if the acquirer hired a financial advisor. It was operationalized as a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if an acquirer hired a financial advisor and a value of 0 otherwise. Data collected 
from SDC of Thomson. 
At the transaction level we accounted for the business level relatedness. Relatedness was used to 
control for the effect if the acquisition is in the same industry. We assessed relatedness as a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if an acquirer acts at the same industry (at 4 digits SIC code), of the target 
firms, and of 0 otherwise.  We also accounted for the deal size since larger deals may be more complex 
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and require firms to pool together a larger volume of capital do complete the acquisition. Although the 
values of a transaction may range from 1 million dollars (minimum value to be included in the database 
SDC) to several billion, we operationalized as a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the deal size was at 
least U$S 100 million, and a value of 0 if it was less than U$S 100 million. Data collected from SDC of 
Thomson.   
 At the country level we included two controls. The target FDI was used to control for the effect 
of the foreign direct investment, measured with the net inflows as % of GDP of the target firm’s country. 
We use the value of the indicator of the target in the year in which the acquisition was announced, with 
data collected from World Bank. We also included the target GDP indicating the target country’s GDP as 
a measure of attractiveness of the economy. Data refers to the year in which the acquisition was 
announced. We used the log value in the estimation. 
Finally, we used the year the acquisition was announced as a control to account for potential 
economic cycles capable of influencing our model. We included a dummy variable for each year between 
2013 and 2017, using 2017 as the base year. 
 
Results 
To test the hypotheses, we conducted three sets of logistic regressions, one for each dependent 
variable. In each case our variable is dichotomous since the acquirer firms may, or may not, hire a financial 
advisor. Table 1 presents the correlations matrix. The correlations are not as high as to raise 
multicollinearity concerns and there is no evidence of multicollinearity in the data. In all regressions, the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) ranged from 1.1 to 1.8. 
We highlight that some of the control variables for hire financial advisor on the acquirer´s country 
is not significant which denotes that the relation sought after is not sensitive to the acquirer experience 
involved in the deal. The variables on the deal size are also not significant pointing that the size of the 
acquisition is not related to hiring a financial advisor on the acquirer´s target. Pertaining to the target, in 
addition to not being significant, the target FDI is not significant.  The results confirm that relatedness 
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industry influence the hire of a financial advisor on the target´s country. That is, if the target and the 
acquirer are in the same industry, the more likely the acquirers will hire a financial advisor. Hence, we 
found partial evidence for the impact of control acquisition on this case. We were able to confirm 
significant effects for Target GDI, Target Public, Acquirer Public, which means that bigger companies 
tend to hire financial advisory. However, we also found that the target also hired a financial advisor has 
significance on the model.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations matrix. 
 
Table 2 includes the results of the logistic regression for the dependent variable: acquirer hires 
financial advisor in the acquirer´s country. Model 1 includes only the control variables. Models 2 to 4 test 
the hypotheses. Model 5 is the complete model. In model 2 we test H1a suggesting positive relation 
between the target country’s institutional image and hiring a financial advisor in the acquirer country. A 
negative and significant coefficient (β=-0.875, p<0.05) denotes that the effect is contrary to our 
predictions. The poorer the institutional image of the target country, less acquirer firms tend to hire 
financial advisory services in the acquirer country. That is not reasonable when we consider that hiring a 
local firm may be perceived as a guarantee that it will be better able to navigate through an array of 
Mean Std. Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Advisor Acquirer Home Country .340 .474 1
2. Advisor Acquirer Host Country .176 .381 -,305
** 1




4. WGI Target -.324 .225 -,122
** .066 .064 1
























8. Acquirer Experience .159 .366 -.006 -,123
**
,095
* .012 -.029 -.027 ,080
* 1
9. Deal Size .332 .471 -.072 -.039 ,105
** -.052 .049 -,085
* .025 ,092
* 1
10. Control Acquisition .643 .479 ,122
** -.066 -.065 .026 -.077 -.040 -.013 -.077 -.049 1







12. Target GDP .038 .105 ,089





** -.049 .019 -.013 -.047 -,095
* 1
13. Target Public .192 .394 -,199
**
,191
** .038 -.015 .012 .050 -.014 -.006 ,187
**
-,422
** -.071 -.052 1







** .052 .038 .028 .052 -,127
** 1
15. Target hired Financial Advisor .357 .479 -,149
** -.071 ,195
** .062 -.056 ,148










**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
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institutional inefficiencies. Model 3 tests H2a proposing an effect of institutional distance and this 
hypothesis was confirmed by a positive and significant coefficient (β=0.703, p<0.001). We can affirm that 
acquirer firms are more likely to hire a financial advisor in the acquirer’s country to advise a cross-border 
acquisition the greater the institutional distance between the countries. However, we also found a negative 
and significant coefficient for the effect of geographic distance (β=-0.798, p<0.001) and thus we fail to 
confirm H3a. This is prima facie evidence that acquirer firms are less likely to hire a financial advisor in 
the acquirer’s country to advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the geographic distance between the 
countries.  
 
Table 2. Logistic regression results: Acquirer hires financial advisor in the acquirer country 
 
Logistic regression for the acquirer hire financial advisor on the acquirer´s country
WGI Target -0.875 ** 1.051
Institutional Distance 0.703 *** 0.588 *
Geographic Distance -0.762 *** -0.798 ***
Relatedness 0.864 *** 0.811 *** 0.708 *** 0.623 *** 0.553 **
Acquirer Experience 0.011 0.013 -0.068 0.149 0.147
Deal Size 0.088 0.122 0.198 0.280 0.302
Control Acquisition -0.259 -0.258 -0.351 * -0.267 -0.285
Target FDI -0.067 -0.059 -0.027 -0.068 -0.037
Target GDP 3.358 *** 2.874 *** 2.912 ** 1.148 0.659
Target Public 0.964 *** 0.961 *** 0.910 *** 1.034 *** 1.026 ***
Acquirer Public -0.317 * -0.363 * -0.345 * -0.317 -0.311
Target hired Financial Advisor 0.535 *** 0.498 ** 0.473 ** 0.254 0.253
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.411 -0.872 -2.268 * 5.363 *** 4.739 ***
n 642 642 642 642 642
R
2
0.16 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.28
chi-square test 80.6 84.7 93.0 127.2 131.5
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
How Hiring Financial Advisors in Cross-Border Acquisitions in The BRICS is Driven by The 




Revista BASE – v.17, n.2, abril/junho 2020 
 
Table 3 includes the results of the logistic regression for the dependent variable: acquirer hires 
financial advisor in the target´s country. Model 6 includes only the control variables. Models 7 to 9 test 
the hypotheses, and model 10 is the complete model.  
In model 7 we test the effect of the target country institutional image on the likelihood the acquirer 
will hire financial advisors locally in the target country. A non-significant coefficient (β=0.730, ns) does 
not permit us to confirm H1b. A negative and significant coefficient (β=-0.545, p<0.05) in model 8 reveals 
a negative effect of institutional distance on the likelihood the acquirer will hire financial advisor in the 
target firm’s country, which is contrary to our prediction. Hence, we fail to confirm H2b. Moreover, a 
non-significant coefficient in model 9 for the effect of geographic distance (β=0.860, ns) also does not 
allow us to confirm H3b. This is prima facie evidence that the effect of institutional and distance effects 
on the acquirer’s decision of which financial advisory services to hire is not straightforward.  
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Table 3. Logistic regression results: Acquirer hires financial advisor in the target country 
 
Table 4 includes the results of the logistic regression for the dependent variable: acquirer hires a 
global financial advisor. Model 11 includes only the control variables. Models 12 to 14 test the hypotheses. 
Model 15 is the complete model. 
In model 12 we test H1c suggesting positive relation between the target country’s institutional 
image and hiring a global financial advisor. A non-significant coefficient (β=0.273, ns) does not permit 
us to confirm H1c. Model 13 tests H2c proposing an effect of institutional distance and this hypothesis 
was not confirmed by a negative and non-significant coefficient (β=-0.159, ns). However, we also found 
a positive and significant coefficient for the effect of geographic distance (β=0.661, p<0.001) and thus we 
were able to confirm H3c. This is an evidence that the effect of geographic distance effects on the 
acquirer’s decision of which financial advisory services to hire is straightforward.  
Logistic regression for the acquirer hire financial advisor on the target´s country
WGI Target 0.730 -0.388
Institutional Distance -0.545 ** -0.563 **
Geographic Distance 0.086 0.051
Relatedness -0.165 -0.100 -0.054 -0.152 -0.043
Acquirer Experience 1.116 *** 1.125 *** 1.148 *** 1.075 ** 1.131 **
Deal Size 0.204 0.175 0.213 0.330 0.331
Control Acquisition -0.056 -0.054 -0.067 -0.356 -0.310
Target FDI 0.197 * 0.172 0.147 0.166 0.137
Target GDP -2.901 ** -2.587 ** -1.922 -2.665 * -2.218
Target Public -1.322 *** -1.318 *** -1.355 *** -1.696 *** -1.702 ***
Acquirer Public 0.276 0.309 0.337 0.210 0.236
Target hired Financial Advisor 0.667 ** 0.682 *** 0.667 ** 0.502 * 0.525 *
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -4.975 *** -4.564 *** -3.614 *** -5.111 *** -3.799 **
n 642 642 642 642 642
R
2
0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16
chi-square test 53.6 55.7 59.0 55.3 59.6
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1.
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
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Table 4. Logistic regression results: Acquirer hires a global financial advisor 
 
In sum, the results do not confirm that the poorer institutional image of the target country influence 
the choice of the financial advisors. We were able only to confirm 2 hypotheses (H2a and H3c). That is 
acquirer firms are more likely to hire a financial advisor in the acquirer’s country to advise a cross-border 
acquisition the greater the institutional distance between the countries. And also, that acquirer firms are 
more likely to hire a global financial advisor to advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the geographic 
distance between the countries. 
That is, we are able only to confirm that institutional distance and geographic distance between the 
countries can influence in the choice of the financial advisor when considering a CBA at the BRICS. 
Possibly geographic distance increases the difficulties in studying a potential distant target, in addition to 
Logistic regression for the acquirer hire global financial advisor
WGI Target 0.273 -0.429
Institutional Distance -0.159 -0.070
Geographic Distance 0.661 *** 0.698 ***
Relatedness -0.677 *** -0.657 *** -0.611 *** -0.503 ** -0.502 **
Acquirer Experience -0.477 ** -0.476 ** -0.423 * -0.600 ** -0.609 **
Deal Size -0.235 -0.245 -0.307 -0.494 ** -0.491 **
Control Acquisition 0.245 0.246 0.346 * 0.442 ** 0.440 **
Target FDI -0.077 -0.080 -0.086 -0.081 -0.080
Target GDP -1.241 -1.096 -1.544 0.336 0.371
Target Public 0.230 0.232 0.283 0.448 0.450
Acquirer Public 0.183 0.196 0.178 0.202 0.190
Target hired Financial Advisor -0.812 *** -0.802 *** -0.779 *** -0.523 ** -0.525 **
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.939 1.082 1.434 -4.421 *** -4.747 ***
n 642 642 642 642 642
R
2
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.21
chi-square test 59.4 59.9 63.1 95.8 96.5
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1.
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
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the costs that arise from distance that are hard to overcome using the communication technologies. In 
these instances, a global financial advisor may be a viable alternative. In terms of the institutional distance 
is reasonable to influence when we consider that hiring a financial advisor can be perceived as a guarantee 
that it will be better able to navigate through an array of institutional differences.  
 
Discussion and Final Remarks 
In this study, we examined the influence of institutional image, institutional and geographic 
distances on the choice of financial advisors in cross-border acquisitions in the BRICS countries. We 
proposed that both the target firms’ countries institutional image and the investor-target country distances 
influenced the choice of financial advisors. The choice of financial advisors is important because they can 
be used to reduce institutional uncertainties and hazards. Our main findings point that acquirer firms are 
more likely to hire a financial advisor in the acquirer’s country to advise a cross-border acquisition the 
greater the institutional distance between the countries. However, greater is the geographic distance the 
more the acquirer will tend to hire a global financial advisor. 
Possibly geographic distance increases the difficulties in studying a potential distant target, in 
addition to the costs that arise from distance that are hard to overcome using the communication 
technologies. In these instances, a global financial advisor may be a viable alternative. That is probably 
the reason we were able to confirm that greater is the geographic distance the more the acquirer will tend 
to hire a global financial advisor. geographic distance has also been shown to bear an effect on a variety 
of international business facets and decisions such as trade, foreign investment, and other types of 
economic activity taking place between countries (Anderson, 1979; Deadorff, 1998). Geographic distance 
increases transport and communication costs and makes managing at a distance more hazardous (Hamilton 
& Winters, 1992; Fratianni & Oh, 2009). We also found that acquirer firms are more likely to hire a 
financial advisor in the acquirer’s country to advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the institutional 
distance between the countries. This probably happens because emerging economies tend to have poorer 
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governance and systems of accountability (Luo & Tung, 2007) and the emerging economies firms (EEFs) 
to lack brand names and superior technology (He et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014). 
 Emerging economies tend to have poorer governance and systems of accountability (Luo & Tung, 
2007) and the EEFs to lack brand names and superior technology (He et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014). 
However, targeting EEFs may prove to be an opportunity for the acquirers’ growth strategy. Based on the 
experiences of developed economy MNCs, the existing literature in the area has been established on the 
assumption that MNCs originate from countries where the institutional image is less positive (Dikova et 
al., 2010). Based on an analysis of 642 CBAs conducted by financial advisors from five major EMs, we 
find the following:  (1) acquirer firms are more likely to hire a financial advisor in the acquirer’s country 
to advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the institutional distance between the countries; (2) acquirer 
firms are more likely to hire a global financial advisor to advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the 
geographic distance between the countries. 
This study contributes to the literature on the impact of the institutional environment in the process 
of hiring a financial advisor and in the CBAs involving targets on emerging markets (Rau, 2000). Financial 
advisors have been shown to play an important role in reducing information asymmetry and the transaction 
costs involved in a transaction (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). Our results confirm that acquirer firms are more 
likely to hire a financial advisor in the target’s country to advise a cross-border acquisition the poorer the 
institutional image of the target country.  
Hence, there is as contribution on the perception of the importance of the exchange and 
transmission of information between counterparts may influence several aspects of the transaction such as 
the premium paid and cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date (Finnerty et al., 2012). 
Also, the CBAs are especially prone to raise several challenges of foreignness (Eden & Miller, 2004). 
These challenges include such issues as differences in institutional forces, including national culture, 
customer preferences, and business practices, and legitimacy concerns (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
Moreover, the acquirer’s lack of experience with cross-border acquisitions and lack or absence of prior 
experience in the target country may inhibit the confidence of stakeholders in the deal. Other aspects that 
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may raise concerns refer to the misidentification of asset complementarities, complications in target 
assessment, and informational asymmetries, that may have an adverse effect on the success of the 
transaction (Dikova et al., 2010). Our results confirm that acquirer firms are more likely to hire a global 
financial advisor to advise a cross-border acquisition the greater the geographic distance between the 
countries. 
This study seeks to maximize the internal validity by assuring rigorous control of the data 
collection, which can be replicable in other studies. It also establishes a trustworthy cause-and-effect 
relationship as we examine how the target country’s institutional image and home-host institutional and 
geographic distance influence the acquirer firms’ hiring financial advisors in cross-border acquisitions 
(CBAs) in the BRICS. On the external validity point of view, we consider that it refers to the extent to 
which our results can be applied (generalized) to other countries for example. Future studies in different 
rising economies, or economies, or with over five target countries, could offer a higher understanding of 
however acquirer rent their monetary advisors once increasing into institutionally less developed 
countries. 
  
Research limitations and future directions 
This study has limitations. First, the limitations imposed by insufficiencies in the available data 
that unable additional analyses. For instance, it would be relevant to consider if the acquirer had previous 
experience in the actual target country. We only considered previous experience. Other data potentially 
relevant include data on the previous experience (acquisitions) in the target country. Moreover, the 
acquirer’s lack of experience with cross-border acquisitions and lack or absence of prior experience in the 
target country may inhibit the confidence of stakeholders in the deal. Other aspects that may raise concerns 
refer to the misidentification of asset complementarities, complications in target assessment, and 
informational asymmetries, that may have an adverse effects adverse effect on the success of the 
transaction (Dikova et al., 2010). Future research will possibly require data collect on the previous 
experience of the acquirer by country. 
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Other limitation considerations the main target on acquisitions within the BRICS. though we tend 
to believe that these markets cowl a spread of economic and institutional development levels, researchers 
are also curious about acquisitions from the massive range of EEFs apart from these 5, that are more and 
more actively collaborating in M&A transactions. Future studies in different rising economies, or 
economies, or with over five target countries, could offer a higher understanding of however acquirer rent 
their monetary advisors once increasing into institutionally less developed countries. 
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